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LECTURE
In Search of the Solicitor
General's Clients: A Drama
with Many Characters*
BY DREw S. DAYS Ill**
I want, first, to express my sincerest appreciation for the invitation to
deliver the Ninth Judge Mac Swinford Lecture at the University of
Kentucky College of Law. It is a pleasure for me to get out of Washing-
ton for a change - to begin with, to remind myself of what life is like
"outside of the Beltway." I also saw this as an opportunity to see friends
here at the law school whom I can no longer plan on encountering each
year at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools,
since I am on leave from my law faculty. But, most importantly, there is
a certain "rightness," I think, in being here as the Fortieth Solicitor
General, since the first person to occupy my position was Benjamin H.
Bristow, a Kentuckian.1
Benjamin H. Bristow, the first Solicitor General of the United States,
was one of the leading lawyers of his generation. A Kentuckian, he
served as a colonel during the Civil War. He later became United States
Attorney for the District of Kentucky, where he was renowned for his
vigor in enforcing the federal Civil Rights Acts.2 Before becoming
Solicitor General in 1870, he practiced law with his fellow Kentuckian
and future Supreme Court Justice, the first John Marshall Harlan.3
* This is an edited and embellished version of the Ninth Judge Mac Swinford Lecture,
delivered at the University of Kentucky College of Law on November 10, 1994.
** Solicitor General of the United States.
1 BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECrORY OF THE UNrrED STATES EXEcUTvE BRANCH, 1774-
1971, at 35-36 (Robert Sobel ed., 1971).
2 Douglas L. Colbert Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a
Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNElL L. REV. 1,
53 n.250 (1990).
3 BIOGRAPHICAL DIREyTORY OF THE UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE BRANCH, supra
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After serving as Solicitor General, Bristow became a leading railroad
lawyer and almost became Attorney General in the Grant Administration.
His name was frequently mentioned for the Supreme Court, but he was
instead appointed Secretary of the Treasury by President Grant in 1873.
He later attempted to secure the Republican nomination for President but
failed after a strong first ballot showing. In his later years, Bristow
conducted a successful law practice in New York4
Bt Bristow was just the first of three Solicitors General from
Kentucky, according to my researoh. The second, William M. Bullitt,
born in Louisville, was appointed Solicitor General in July of 1912 by
President Taft and served until March of the following year. After leaving
office, Bullitt became a prominent private practitioner in the state who
also on occasion was recruited to represent the federal government in
particularly important litigation.5 He also was known for his Bullitt's
Civil and Criminal Codes of Kentucky,' published in 1899 and re-edited
in 19027
The third, Stanley F. Reed, who later became an Associate Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, was born in Mason County, Kentucky.
Prior to being appointed Solicitor General in March of 1935 by President
Franklin Roosevelt, Reed carried on a distinguished private practice in
Maysville, Kentucky, and served as a member of the Kentucky House of
Representatives from 1912 to 1916. During his tenure as Solicitor
General, Reed had the responsibility of defending, in the Supreme Court,
most of Roosevelt's "New Dear' laws whose constitutionality had been
challenged. In January of 1938 Reed left his post as Solicitor General to
accept an appointment to the Supreme Court
I. BACKGROUND
The Office of Solicitor General was established in 1870 to provide
the Attorney General with assistance in discharging his or her official
duties.9 Over the intervening 124 years, however, a tradition of indepen-
dence, both within the Department of Justice and the Executive Branch
as a whole, developed with respect to the Solicitor General's role.
note 1, at 35-36.
4Id.
5 Note, Mr. Justice Reed -Swing Man or Not, 1 STAN. L. REV. 714, 715-16 (1949).
6 Id.
7 WESLEy MCCUNE, THaE NINE YOUNG MEN 58-60 (1969).
Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 5, at 716-18.
'Act of Juno 22, 1870, ch. 150, §§ 1-2, 16 Stat. 162, 162.
[VOL. 83
SwiNFoRD LECTURE
Although the Solicitor General is appointed by the President and works for
the Attorney General, it is rare for his decisions to be overruled by either of
his superiors.' °
Consequently, for most purposes, the Solicitor General has the last word
with respect to whether, and on what grounds, the United States will seek
review in the Supreme Court, and he determines what cases from the federal
trial courts the government will seek to reverse on appeal. In this process, the
Solicitor General is not a "hired gun." To be sure, he is not a policy-maker
in the sense that other presidential appointees at the cabinet and sub-cabinet
levels are. But in the course of acting as a legal policy-maker regarding
governmental litigation, the Solicitor General not only advises his colleagues
as to means to achieve certain ends but also helps them to clarify ends in
light of the wisdom that is often gained from court challenges to federal
policies.
One of my predecessors who later became Attorney General, Francis
Biddle, was prompted by this tradition to remarkc
He [the Solicitor General] determines what cases to appeal and the client has
no say in the matter, he does what his lawyer tells him, the lawyer stands
in his client's shoes, for the client is but an abstraction... [H]is guide is
only the ethic of his profession framed in the ambience of his experience
and judgment."
This is a rather rhapsodic and inaccurate picture of the Solicitor General's
role. However, this description does capture the fact that his responsibility is
ultimately not to any particular agency or person in the federal government
but rather to "the interests of the United States" which may, on occasion,
conflict with the short-term programmatic goals of an affected governmental
entity. Furthermore, the Solicitor General occupies an especially prominent
position as an officer of the federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court,
where the "ethic of his profession framed in the ambience of his experience
and judgment"'2 must be punctiliously observed. Even if he were not
inclined by reasons of principle to adhere to high standards of candor and fair
dealing before the Court, the pragmatics of the Solicitor General "repeat
player" status before the Court would require such adherence. 3 In many
10 REBECCA M. SALOKAP, THE SouciToR GmERAL: THE POLTCS OF LAW 6,10-12
(1992).
"Id. at 7; see also LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE Soucrrok
GENERAL AND TE RULE OF LAW 18 (1987).
1 SALOKAR, supra note 10, at 7.
'Id. at 30-31 (citing Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead-
1994-95]
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ways, the Solicitor General is invited by tradition, as well as statute and
regulation, to step out from the role of partisan advocate to assist in the
orderly development of the law and to insist that justice be done even
where the immediate interests of the federal government may not appear
to benefit. Let me give three examples. First, Solicitors General have
"acquiesced" in efforts by opponents in litigation to obtain Supreme
Court review of cases in which the government prevailed below. They
have done so because, while confident of the government's position, they
believed that it was in the best interests of the country to have a contested
legal question definitively resolved by the Supreme Court. 4 Second,
they have "confessed error" in other cases where the government won in
the lower courts but they concluded that a "fundamental error" had led
to that result. 5 I should note that lower court judges do not look
favorably upon confessions of error. Judge Simon Sobeloff was quoted
as saying: "When I was Solicitor General, I thought that confessing error
was the noblest function of the office. Now that I am a circuit judge, I
know that it is the lowest trick one lawyer can play on another."'" And
Judge Learned Hand, the subject of Professor Gerald Gunther's well-
received new biography, 7 said, "It is bad enough to have the Supreme
Court reverse you, but I will be damned if I will be reversed by some
Solicitor General."18 Finally, the Solicitor General is often asked
formally by the Supreme Court through a process referred to in the
relevant jargon as "CVSG," a call for the views of the Solicitor General,
to express his views on whether a pending petition for certiorari in a non-
government case should be granted. In such instances, the Court is not
seeking the advice of an advocate or a partisan but rather of an officer of
that Court committed to providing his best judgment with respect to the
matter at issue. 9
You will recall that I just called Francis Biddle's description of the
Solicitor General's role "rather rhapsodic and inaccurate." I did so
because his claim that the Solicitor General's "client is but an abstrac-
tion''2° fails to take into account the many interests, if not clients in the
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974)).
14 Id. at 118-19.
"Id. at 119-20.
Aribald Cox, The Government in the Supreme Cowt, 44 CMl. B. RWc. 221, 225
(1963).
17 GELALD GUNTRER, LEARN HAND: TaE MAN AND THE JUDeE (1994).
n Cox, supra note 16, at 224-25.
See CAPLAN, supra note 11, at 257-58.
20 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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strictest sense of the word, that the Solicitor General has to keep in mind
in carrying out his official responsibilities. To paraphrase one of my
distinguished predecessors, Dean Erwin Griswold: "Being Solicitor
General is like walking a tightrope; he always has to keep his bal-
ance."' I have entitled my lecture today, In Search of the Solicitor
General's Clients: A Drama with Many Characters as a way of inviting
you, along with Francis Biddle's ghost, to explore with me four of the
Solicitor General's most important clients or relationships. They are
present at the lower court level but take on far greater intensity and
significance once cases become candidates for the Supreme Court.
IL THE SOLICITOR GENERAL'S
RELATIONSHIP TO THE PRESIDENT
The first is the relationship between the President and the Solicitor
General. Some things about that relationship are obvious: the President
appoints the Solicitor General, and the President, not the Solicitor
General, appears in the Constitutiom Consequently, the President has
the last say, from a constitutional standpoint, as to what the administra-
tion's position before the Supreme Court will be. And there have been a
few occasions in recent years where Presidents have exercised that
constitutional authority by giving explicit instructions to their Solicitors
General to advance certain arguments before the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts. Let me describe the extent to which the literature
has identified significant instances of direct presidential involvement in
the Solicitor General's work.
In the Truman Administration, the President was reportedly involved
in the decision to authorize the filing of the government's first friend of
the court, or amicus curiae brief, in a civil rights case, Shelly v. Kraemer,
which held state enforcement of racially restrictive covenants unconstitu-
tional ' However, the idea to participate as amicus originated in
Solicitor General Philip Pearlman's office, and it appears that Attorney
General Tom Clark probably made the decision after consulting with
Truman.z President Eisenhower personally added several sentences to
2 See ERwwn N. GRiswOLD, OULD FIELDS, NEW CoRtE: TEE PERSONAL Moms
OF A TVETE CENTURY IAWYEL 330 (1992). I note with great personal sadness that
Dean Griswold passed away shortly after I presented this lecture.
2 28 U.S.C. § 505 (1988).
21 U.S. CONST. art II.
334 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1948).
2 See Phillip Elman, The Solicitor Generals Office, Justice 'anlcurter, and Civil
1994-95]
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the government's brief in Brown v. Board of Educaion,6 which were then
edited by an assistant in Solicitor General Simon Sobelofi's office 7
President Nixon ordered Acting Attorney General Kleindienst to drop the
government's appeal to the Supreme Court of an antitrust suit involving
International Telephone & Telegraph Co., an appeal which Solicitor General
Erwin Griswold had approved. After biding time seeking several extensions,
Griswold eventually received clearance to file the government's brief It was
later reported that IT&T had promised to contribute $400,000 for the 1972
Republican National Convention if the administration would settle the suit.28
I have yet to write my memoirs of my tenure as Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights in the Carter Administration where I was directly
involved with Solicitor General Wade McCree in writing the govemment
amicus brief in the Badke case.' But I am prepared to attest to the general
accuracy of published accounts of presidential involvement in that event. The
central question in the administration's conflict over the Bakke case concerned
the govemment amicus participation in the case. The Civil Rights Division
of the Justice Department recommended amicus participation in support of the
University of California and its affirmative action program; the Assistant and
Deputy in the Solicitor General's office recommended amicus participation in
favor of Bakke. Before McCree became Muly involved in the case, President
Carter gave a press conference at which he pledged to support affirmative
action in the case. The Solicitor General office drafted a brief supporting
Bakke, which met with resistance from White House aides. Following
contentious meetings at various levels, Attorney General Griffin Bell
attempted to shield McCree from pressure emanating from the White House
and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; McCree reported that
he never received any direct orders from the White House but was certainly
aware of the pressure being put on Bell. McCree did not follow the advice of
his career staff and eventually decided to recommend that the Court remand
the case to California for the state court to decide3 I should add, however,
Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARv. L. REV. 817, 817-18 (1987);
see also Roger Clegg, The Thirty-Fifth Law Clerk; 1987 DUKE L.J. 964, 965 (reviewing
CAPLAN, supra note 11).
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding racial segregation in state schools unconstitutional).
2 See CAPLAN, supra note 11, at 31-32; SALoKAR, supra note 10, at 72.
2, See CAPLAN, supra note 11, at 35-36; GRISWOLD, supra note 21, at 292-96; ELLIOT
RiCHARDSON, THE CREATIAV BALANCE: GOVERNMENT, POLICS, AND THE INDivIDUAL
iN AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY 27 (1976).
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
30 See CAPLAN, supra note 11, at 39-48; SALoKAR, supra note 10, at 75-76; Clegg,
supra note 25, at 966.
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as a personal note, that the government's brief in Bakke, which McCree and
I, with top staff, wrote in a nearly nonstop session spanning several days,
was embraced significantly by Justice Powell in his opinion. Justice
Powell held that race may, under some circumstances, be an admissions
criterion, so long as quotas were avoided.'
During the Reagan Administration, a major controversy arose over
the Bob Jones University case, which involved the question of a tax
exemption for a religious, but racially segregated, institution.' Solicitor
General Rex Lee decided, because of his prior involvement in the debate
over tax exemptions for religious institutions, to recuse himself from
handling the case. As a result of Lee's decision, the Senior Deputy
Solicitor General, a career lawyer, became Acting Solicitor General. He,
however, had already signed a brief in the Supreme Court during the
Carter Administratidn in support of the Internal Revenue Service's
revocation of the university's tax-exempt status. The Reagan Administra-
tion pushed for an argument supporting the university. The government
brief ultimately filed argued the administration's line under a compromise
in which the Acting Solicitor General signed the brief on the condition
that it included a footnote pointing out that he personally did not
subscribe to the government's position on the first and central question
presented in the brief 33 The Court eventually ruled eight to one in favor
of the Internal Revenue Service.'
Charles Fried, who succeeded Rex Lee as Solicitor General in the
Reagan Administration, recounts only one incident of White House
interference with his work. The case, Communications Workers of
America v. Beck, involved the use of union dues and fees to support pro-
union candidates and parties. 5 Fried felt that no state action was
31 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
3' Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
- See CAPLAN, supra note 11, at 51-64; SALoKAR, supra note 10, at 61-62.
Solicitors General have occasionally gone one step further and refused to sign the
government's brief. See, e.g., GmsWOLD, supra note 21, at 277-78; SALOKAR, spra note
10, at 73; Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Changes Sance in Case on Obscenity, N.Y. TrEms,
Nov. 11, 1984, at A15. For example, Simon Sobeloff, Solicitor General during the
Eisenhower Administration, declined to support the government's argument in a loyalty-
security program case. When a friend went to Sobeloff out of concern that he was
throwing away a chance at a probable appointment to the Supreme Court as a result of
pressure from his fiends, Sobeloff replied. "I do not take this step because I want to be
able to live with my friends. I do it because I have to be able to live with myself." David
L. Bazelon, Tribute to Simon E. Sobeloff, 34 MD. L. REV. 486, 488 (1974).
34 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585.
"487 U.S. 735, cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988).
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involved in the practice and that the Taft-Hartley Act could not be
plausibly read as forbidding the compulsory use of union dues. Proofs of
Fried's brief were circulated to the White House, and someone at the
White House contacted Attorney General Edwin Meese to express
displeasure with the brief. Following a meeting called by Meese, Fried's
brief was ultimately filed in the court. Nonetheless, the White House
position - namely, that the Taft-Hartley Act could be construed to
prohibit the compulsory use of union dues - prevailed five to three in the
Court. 6 Concerning this incident, Fried emphasized that "[i]n Beck [he]
received no direct order [but] was made aware that 'the White House' did
not like the position [he] was about to take." 37
It is reported that my immediate predecessor, Kenneth Starr, had the
following experience in the Bush Administration. After a meeting with
a group of black college presidents, President Bush ordered Starr to
reverse the government's position in United States v. Fordicel to
support increased state aid to black public colleges to remedy discrimina-
tion. In the opening brief in the case, which was at that time titled United
States v. Mabus,39 the government had argued that Mississippi should
not be responsible to provide additional funding for traditionally black
colleges' After presidential intervention, the government's reply brief
took the opposite stance and urged that the state should supply additional
funding to traditionally black colleges to overcome the effects of its
segregated system of higher education.4! '
My story would be incomplete, and I would be less than candid with
you, if I failed to note that last September, President Clinton directed me
to withdraw our brief and not participate in oral argument in a case in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The case,
See CHALES FRmD, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION - A
FmSTHAND ACCOUNT 175-82 (1991).37 Id. at 198.
3 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992) (holding that the state of Mississippi violated equal
protection by failing to rectify racial imbalances in school system attributable to prior de
jure discrimination by state).
39 499 U.S. 958 (1991).
40 See Brief for the United States at 32-34, 41 n.39, United States v. Mabus, 112 S.
Ct. 2727 (1992) (No. 90-1205), 1991 WL 527603, at *63-65, *76-77 n.39.
41 See Reply Brief for the United States at n.*, United States v. Mabus, 112 S. Ct.
2727 (1992) (No. 90-1205), 1991 WL 538730, at *21-22 & n.*; see also Ruth Marcus,
Bush Shifts Stand on Aid to Black Colleges, Administration Now &qports Increased State
Funding in Mississippi Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1991, at A6; Ruth Marcus, Some
Justices Appear Skeptical of Mississippi Colleges' Racial Split, WASH. POST, Nov. 14,
1991, at A4.
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Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church,42 awaiting decision, pits
the recently enacted Religious Freedom Restoration Act43 against the
federal Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, it presents the question of whether
gifts made by debtors to their churches while insolvent and within one
year of their petitioning for bankruptcy may be recouped by the trustee
in bankruptcy for the benefit of creditors. In the brief we filed in the
Eighth Circuit, we took the position that the new act did not alter prior
practice in such situations and that recoupment was, consequently, proper.
During the intervening period between our filing and oral argument, the
President - who takes personal pride in having signed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, is strongly committed to its effective enforce-
ment, and is a lawyer - decided that the Administration should not
pursue its original position."
What is notable about the history I have just recounted is not that
incidents of direct presidential involvement in the work of the Solicitor
General have occurred but that they have been so relatively few in
number. There are several reasons for this fact. The most mundane is that
it is extremely difficult for the President and his White House staff to
oversee the work of the Solicitor General on a day-to-day basis. Second,
given the way that the decision-making process works, by the time a case
has reached the point of possible appellate court or Supreme Court
review, the policy concerns of the President have usually been fully
presented to the Solicitor General by his appointees in the affected
departments and agencies. Third, and the reason set forth most often, is
that a tradition has developed over the years of respect for the Solicitor
General's independence within the entire Executive Branch.
From a pragmatic standpoint, Presidents have concluded that their
direct interference in the Solicitor General's decision-making process in
a particular case may damage the administration's credibility, especially
in the Supreme Court, with respect to its entire litigation program. To
paraphrase one of my predecessors, what an administration needs is a
Solicitor General, not a "Pamphleteer General." '45 Whether this concern
is valid has not been confirmed, to my knowledge, but the tradition endures.
42 Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Church (In re Young), 148 B.R. 886 (Bankr. D.
Mim 1992), a'd, 152 B.R. 939 (D. Mim. 1993).
4' 42 U.S.C. § 2000b (Supp. V 1993).
See Paul M. Barett, Clinton Orders Jhutice Agency to Withdraw Brief, WALL ST.
1., Sept. 16, 1994, at B5; Pierre Thomas, Clinton Stops Justice Department from Seeking
Forfeiture of Tithes, WAsH. PosT, Sept. 16, 1994, at A8.45 Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government, Politics, Polemics & Pr'nciple, 47
OHIo ST. L.J. 595, 600 (1986); see CAPLAN, supra note 11, at 107.
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This should not suggest, however, that the Solicitor General operates
completely isolated from and insensitive to the President's concerns.
Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that most Solicitors General have been
selected, in part, because they are likely to generally be supportive of the
President's policies and objectives. Moreover, the White House staff can
be an extremely helpful source of policy guidance when executive
departments and agencies are internally conflicted or disagree with one
another over policy priorities. There are also circumstances where the
legal considerations are in equipoise and the administration's policy
preference becomes dispositive. This calculus becomes highly sensitive,
however, where the Solicitor General is contemplating taking a position
on an issue that differs from one embraced by a prior administration. My
position is that such changes should not be lightly undertaken. When they
are, the new arguments advanced should have legal integrity.
Ill. THE SOLIcrroR GENERAL'S RELATIONSHIP
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The second relationship I would like to address is that between the
Solicitor General and the Attorney General. The Solicitor General's
position was created in 1870 to assist the Attorney General as circum-
stances dictated.4 Indeed, Benjamin Bristow had no sooner been sworn
into office before he headed south to Mississippi to prosecute members
of the Ku Klux Klan But as the complexity of the Attorney General's
responsibilities has increased, the role of the Solicitor General has
become more specialized. For the Attorney General must be, at once,
both the chief law enforcement officer of the United States and a member
of the President's cabinet, a political officer. Other societies have
attempted to divorce these two functions between a career "Attorney
General" and a political "Minister of Justice," but we have not.
In any event, in part because of this tension, a tradition has developed
of Solicitor General independence within the Justice Department.
Although the Attorney General is, by law and regulation, the Solicitor
General's boss, prior occupants have been left generally free "to consider
the questions involved and to formulate [their] own initial views with
respect to them without interference from the Attorney General.""' The
clearest, most succinct consideration of this relationship is found in an
46 See SALOKAR, smpra note 10, at 10-11.
47 See CAPLAN, supra note 11, at 5.
48 Role of the Solicitor, 1 op. Off. Legal Counsel 228, 233 (1977).
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Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel in September of 1977.!" Leaving the
Solicitor General alone at the initial stage of deliberation, the opinion
suggests, ensures that the Attorney General and the President get the benefit
of the Solicitor General's independent judgment in every case and that the
Attorney General does not exercise her supervisory powers gratuitously.'
Given the extensive involvement of the Attorney General in policy
matters, the opinion argues that both the Attorney General and the President
are benefitted by a Solicitor General who is accorded a large measure of
independence free of policy considerations that "might, on occasion, cloud a
clear vision of what the law requires."' Attorney General Janet Reno and
I have taken the anangement set out in the 1977 opinion as the guide for our
relationship. I take the responsibility to advise her in advance of my intended
decisions in high profile cases should she have any guidance or any questions.
She, of course, has the power to overule me.
Charles Fried said he "took comfort' from the fact that the Attorney
General could overrule him. Whenever another Justice Department or
administration official challenged one of his decisions, Fried would simply
direct them to the Attorney General 2 Fried added:
It seemed to me that this fred me to take whatever position seemed right
to me, while giving people a sense that a mute of correction was open. It
also clarified my relations to the Attorney General, since I could engage in
all kinds of informal exchanges with him but still make the point when I
was making a final decision on my personal authority. If the Attorney
General did not approve it, he could overrule it. 3
IV. THE SOLIcrrOR GENERAL'S RELATIONSHIP
TO INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENcIEs
The third relationship involves independent regulatory agencies.'
Since 1870, the Attorney General has directed and controlled most federal
4 
Id.
0 Id.
Id. at 232.
5 FRIED, spra note 36, at 198.
Id. at 198-99.
4 The statutory responsibility for representing the United States in the Supreme
Court, 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (as amended in 1982), has been delegated by the Attorney
General to the Solicitor General through the Department of Justice regulations, 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.20(a) (as amended in 1984). See FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 115 S. Ct. 537,
540-41 (1994); United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1988).
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litigation.5  Independent regulatory agencies were established by
Congress to enjoy a certain degree of autonomy from the Executive
Branch. A few independent regulatory agencies have the authority to
litigate their own cases in the Supreme Court. But even those agencies
do not exercise it in most instances, since it is thought that the absence
of the Solicitor General's involvement raises questions about the merits
of such filings; in fact, such briefs are described as having a "tin can tied
to them."'57 Therefore, the Solicitor General is usually the Supreme
Court lawyer for such agencies. He is confronted with the question of
how to carry out his "gate-keeper" function of ensuring that only the
most meritorious and promising government cases get to the Court, while
respecting the independence of the regulatory agency. More often,
however, the challenge arises when an executive department and an
independent regulatory agency are at odds as to what position should be
taken in a Supreme Court case involving other parties. What should the
amicus brief say? Should there be one at all, for that matter? Imagine, if
you will, conflicts between the National Labor Relations Board and the
Department of Labor, or between the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
A recent commentator, Professor Neal Devins, identifies three
principal arguments (all of which he then discounts) favoring the Solicitor
General's centralized litigating authority: (1) a trust that the Solicitor
General will remain sensitive to an independent agency's concerns, (2) a
belief that agencies exchange control to make use of the Solicitor
General's prestige and expertise in Supreme Court advocacy, and (3) the
idea that centralization benefits the Court by resolving intra-executive
" Congress instituted this centralization of litigating authority in the Department of
Justice "under the pressure of legal claims arising from the Civil War." Susan M. Olson,
Challenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate Over Federal Litigating Authority, 68
JUDICATURE 71, 75 (1984) (citing "Exhibit 1: Summary [of History of the Distribution
of Litigating Authority] by Department of Justice," 18 CoNG. REC. 21882-85 (daily ed.
June 21, 1972)); see 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the
conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof, is a party,
or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department
of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General"); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States, 534 F.2d 889, 901 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (explaining that since the power under 28 U.S.C.
§ 516 (1988) is so "broadly inclusive," it must be narrowly construed).
See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control Over
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 274-76 (1994); Olson, spra note
55, at 73.
' See CAPLAN, supra note 11, at 9; James L. Cooper, Note, The Solicitor General
and the Evolution of Activism, 65 IND. L.J. 675, 696 n.59 (1990).
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conflicts on policy matters prior to presentation of an issue to the Court
and enhancing the Court's ability to manage its docket by relying on the
Solicitor General's recommendations on a case's "cert-worthiness."
58
On the other hand, it is argued that agency lawyers generally will
have more intricate knowledge of each case and have more expertise
concerning their own programs, regulatory structure, and applicable legal
precedent. The Solicitor General also may be influenced by (from the
agency's point-of-view) different outside interests, such as the President.
Any disparities in general trial and appellate expertise between Justice
Department and agency lawyers may simply reflect the agency lawyers'
inability to obtain sufficient experience under the current centralized
scheme." Because of these factors, cases for or against independent
litigating authority cannot be satisfactorily based solely on qualities such
as experience or objectivity.
It is generally accepted that the Solicitor General's ability to exercise
control over an aspect of an agency's litigation does "to some extent
curtail" its freedom.' Through the Solicitor General, the Executive can,
for specific legal issues, control policies central to many independent
agencies." In fact, even the unexercised threat of such control might
alter an agency's litigating strategy;, in such cases, in a dynamic similar
to a presidential veto, an agency may be forced to reassess or compro-
mise its independent policies to accommodate the Solicitor General's
views. Apparently, Solicitors General have felt correlative pressures to
accommodate the independent agencies, as exemplified by a 1966 study
" Devins, supra note 56, at 280; Todd Lochner, The Relationship Between the Qfice
of Solicitor General and the Independent Agencies, 79 VA. L. REv. 549, 569-70 (1993)
(listing four functions of the Solicitor General: acting as a gatekeeper, providing one
governmental voice, representing wide-ranging governmental interests, and providing his
expertise); see also Olson, supra note 55, at 78-79 (reporting 1980 speech by Associate
Attorney General Robert Ford as stressing five values of centralization "economy and
efficiency, unifomity, rational priority setting, expertise, and objectivity (i.e., better
represent[ion of] the public's interests or the 'broader governmental interests' beyond one
case or one program)").
" See Olson, supra note 55, at 80, 85 (citing more extensive discussion in DONALD
L. Ho1owrrz, THE JuRoCmACy: GovERNmENT LAWYERS, AGENCY PROGRAMS, AND
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 3 (1977)).
60 See Robert L. Stern, The Solicitor General's Office and Adminisirative Litigation,
46 A.BA- J. 154, 218 (1968).
' As has been noted, "[b]y not allowing the agency to make the certiorari petition
decision itself, the Solicitor General often has the last word on judicial resolution of
independent agency-executive branch policy disputes." Devins, supra note 56, at 259; see
Olson, supra note 55, at 71, 85; Robert L. Stem, "Inconsistency" in Government
Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REV. 759, 769 (1951).
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indicating that the Solicitor General is far more likely to seek certiorari
requests from independent agencies (roughly two-thirds of requests) than
from other agencies (one-ftfth of requests).'
My impression is that the degree of curtailment of agency freedom
changes with each Solicitor General's unique perspective on the need for
a central voice in government litigation (particularly before the Supreme
Court) and the value of agency independence. Each Solicitor General also
brings a different style to the office, which may directly affect each
agency's perception of the "due process" given to it in a particular case
and, thus, its willingness to accept the Solicitor General's counsel. For
example, some Solicitors General seem more willing to take a mediation
approach to inter-departmental conflicts.63 When the Solicitor General
mediates disputes between agencies on specific legal issues, however, he
risks resolving the issues to the "lowest common denominator amalgam
of views." "
The Solicitor General's own independence also affects the relationship
with independent regulatory agencies. The less control other clients exert
over the Solicitor General, the less likely that controversy will arise or
that any such controversy will become too acrimonious to resolve
informally. Non-agency clients also may exert their own views in a
particular case, thereby increasing the volatility of the situation, as my
earlier remarks about the roles of the President and the Attorney General
suggest.' Viewing the Solicitor General's relationship with independent
agencies in isolation, therefore, necessarily presents an incomplete picture.
V. Tm SoLICrrOR GENERAL'S RELATIONSHIP TO CONGRESS
By now, you may be losing count of the Solicitor General's clients.
Is anyone left? Yes, the United States Congress! Commenting on this
' See Devins, supra note 56, at 288 (citing William Brigman, the Office of the
Solicitor General of the United States); see also Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Commerce and Finance of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.
5050 and H.R 340 Bills to Amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; to Provide
Authorizations for Appropriates for the Securities and Exchange Commission for Fiscal
Years 1974, 1975, and 1976; and for Other Purposes, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 333 (1973)
(noting that from 1963 to 1973 the Solicitor General acceded to more than 75% of
certiorari requests by independent agencies).
63 See Ronald S. Chamberlain, Mixing Politics and Justice: The Office of the Solicitor
General, 4 J. op L. & PoL. 379, 396-97 (1987) (discussing Solicitor General Griswold).
61 Jeffery A. Burt & Irving S. Schloss, Government Litigation in the Supreme Court:
The Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 YALE L.J. 1442, 1467 (1969).65See supra notes 22-53 and accompanying text.
[Vol 83
SwINoRD LEcTURE
relationship, one scholar has remarked, that "[o]f the roles the Solicitor
General plays, this is perhaps the one that has been least examined." '
For the most part, the relationship between the Solicitor General and
Congress grows out of the fact that the Solicitor General has the power
to decide whether to defend the constitutionality of the acts of Congress
or even affirmatively challenge such laws. Because of the respect to
which Congress is entitled as a coordinate branch of government,
Solicitors General traditionally have recognized a general duty to defend
congressional statutes against constitutional challenges. But because the
Constitution is "the supreme law of the land," ' and the President - and
by extension the Solicitor General - must "take Care that the Laws be
faithfially executed,"" Solicitors General have not risen to the defense
of the acts of Congress in two situations. First, Solicitors General have
always sided with the President in disputes over the constitutionality of
congressional attempts to circumscribe presidential power. The first such
case was Myers v. United tates, in which the Solicitor General
successfully argued that Congress had impermissibly intruded upon the
prerogatives of the Executive Branch by limiting the President's power to
remove a postmaster." Second, Solicitors General have not attempted
"SALOKA, supra note 10, at 86; see also Joshua I. Schwartz, Nwo Perspectives on
the Solicitor General's Independence, 21 Loy. LA.. L. REv. 1119, 1152 (1988) (arguing
that "the Solicitor General, as the lawyer for the United States in the Supreme Court, has
responsibilities that run not only to the executive branch, and the Prsidnt as its head,
but also to the Congress!).67 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
a Id. art. II, § 3.
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
70 Id. at 176. In additionto the Solicitor General's argunent inMyers, the SolicitorGeneral
challenged congressional statutes on the ground that they inmruded upon executive authority in
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,671 (1988) (upholding independent counselprovisions ofthe
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-599 (1988)));
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (invalidating assignment of certain legislative
functions to Comptroller General under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 901-908 (1988))); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,959
(1983) (invalidating the legislative veto); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316-18 (1946)
(invalidating provision of Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, Act of July 12, 1943, 57 Stat.
431, 450, which eliminated salaries of three specifically named executive employees); and
Humphrey's Executor's v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625-32 (1935) (upholding provision of
the Federal Trade Commission Act (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)), which limited
presidentialpower to remove Federal Trade Commission members). See also Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 11-59, 109-43 (1976) (per curiam) (defending challenge to the Federal Election
Campaign Act Act of Feb. 7, 1972, 86 Stat. 3, 88 Stat 1263, which enacted-campaign
contribution and expenditure limitations, but challenging Congress' authority to appoint Federal
Election Commission).
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to defend patently unconstitutional laws.7 "In such cases," Solicitor
General Wade McCree has written, "the Solicitor General's Office is
called upon to give full faith and credit to the fundamental law embodied
in the Constitution, even at the expense of the federal statute."72
The best formal statement of the Justice Department's policy of
defending congressional statutes may be that made by Solicitor General
Rex Lee - who was then an Assistant General - in testimony before the
Senate:
The defense of statutes attacked on constitutional grounds is an
important part of the Justice Department's work. There are essentially
two situations in which the Department will not defend the constitution-
ality of a statute. The first situation involves those cases in which
upholding the statute would have the effect of limiting the President's
constitutional powers or prerogatives. It is neither shocking nor
surprising that the Congress in enacting legislation occasionally takes a
view different from that of the President concerning the President's
rights. It is equally clear that the President is entitled to a defense of his
perceived rights.
The second situation in which the Department will not defend
against a claim of unconstitutionality involves cases where the Attorney
In two other cases, the Solicitor General argued that a bill passed by both houses of
Congress did not become a law. See Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 589, 598
(1938) (holding that a bill vetoed by the President and returned to the Secretary of the
Senate on a day when the Senate was in recess is not law); The Pocket Veto Case, 279
U.S. 655, 672, 691-92 (1929) (holding that a bill subjected to "pocket veto" by the
President is not law).
In three other cases, the Solicitor General defended the Executive's authority to
prosecute a member of Congress or investigate a criminal case, notwithstanding the
Speech or Debate Clause of Article I, § 6 of the U.S. Constitution. See Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606, 621-22 (1972) (holding that Speech or Debate Clause applies to the
aide of amember of Congress but does not immunize aide from testifying before a grand
jury about alleged arrangement for private publication of the Pentagon Papers); United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 527-29 (1972) (holding that member of Congress may
be prosecuted for accepting a bribe in exchange for a promise relating to an official act);
United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169,181-85, cert denied, 385 U.S. 889 (1966) (holdingthat
a conspiracy charge may not be based on a speech delivered by member of Congress).
' One scholar and alumnus of the Solicitor General's office has formulated this
exception in a slightly different way. See Schwartz, supra note 66, at 1155 ("The
constitutionality of acts of Congress is to be defended in all cases, unless no professional-
ly respectable argument can be made in defense of the statute.") (citations omitted).
72 Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor General and His Client, 59 WASH. U. L.Q.
337, 343-44 (1981).
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General believes, not only personally as a matter of conscience, but also
in his official capacity as the Chief Legal officer of the United States,
that a law is so patently unconstitutional that it cannot be defended.
Such a situation is thankfully most rare.
Another important statement of the Justice Department's policy was made
by Benjamin Civiletti, President Carter's second Attorney General, in a
formal letter to Congress:
The Attorney General has a duty to defend and enforce the Acts of
Congress. He also has a duty to defend and enforce the Constitution. If
he is to perform these duties faithfully, he must exercise conscientious
judgment. He must examine the Acts of Congress and the Constitution
and determine what they require of him, and if he finds in a given case
that there is conflict between the requirements of the one and the
requirements of the other, he must acknowledge his dilemma and decide
how to deal with it. That task is inescapably his. 4
The Solicitor General's policy of defending congressional statutes
may have originated as a result of the fact that, historically, Congress
lacked the formal authority to litigate on its own behalf and thus
generally relied upon the Justice Department to do so.' In those cases
in which the Executive and Legislative Branches were irretrievably at
loggerheads, Congress was forced to hire private counsel or even send
one of its own members into court. 6 The Ethics in Government Act of
1978," however, created the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel, which
is empowered and required to intervene or appear as an amicus in any
case "in which the powers and responsibilities of Congress under the
Constitution of the United States are placed in issue."'78 In such cases,
the Senate Legal Counsel is required to "defend vigorously" the
Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings Before
the Subconm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Jud'ciary, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1975) (statement of Rex Lee).
7' Letter from Benjamin Civiletti, Attorney General under President Carter, to the
Chainnan of the Senate Subcommittee on Limitations of Contracted and Delegated
Authority (July 30, 1980), reprinted in 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 55 (1980).
7s See SALOKAR, supra note 10, at 87.
75 For example, in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 65-77 (1926), Senator
George Wharton Pepper was allowed to represent Congress in the Supreme Court by
special invitation to the Court. See SALOKAR, supra note 10, at 87.
2 U.S.C. § 288 (1988).
7 Id. § 288e(a).
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constitutionality of congressional acts and joint resolutions' The bill
resulting in the Senate Legal Counsel originally was to have created a joint
House-Senate Office of Congressional Legal Counsel8 But because the
House of Representatives ultimately did not agree to the creation of a joint
office, the bill was later amended to create only the Office of Senate Legal
Counsel 8' The House, however, has used its internal rule-making powers
to make the House Speakers legal counsel the functional equivalent of the
Senate Legal Counsel2
Because both houses of Congress now have the formal capacity to
represent themselves in court, one could argue that the need for Solicitors
General to presume the constitutionality ot and defend in court, the acts of
Congress is less than it once was. The question may be posed: should the
Solicitor General defend a federal statute that is not patently unconstitutional
but is nonetheless probably unconstitutional, given that Congress now has the
ability to defend its own handiwork? For those who believe that the Solicitor
General should exercise independent judgment, the policy of defending all but
the most blatantly unconstitutional congressional statutes must seem a
departure from the office tradition of independence. Nevertheless, the
Solicitor GeneralIs traditional willingness to champion the acts of Congress
fosters comity between the Executive and Legislative Branches in two
important ways. First, by making it unnecessary for Congress to become
involved in litigation except in unusual cases, the Solicitor General's policy
of defending the acts of Congress ensures that the government speaks with
one voice in the Supreme Court while at the same time reinforcing the
Executive Branch's status as the litigating arm of the government. 3 Second,
the policy prevents the Executive Branch from using litigation as a form of
post-enactment veto of legislation that the current administration dislikes."
As a concomitant of the Solicitor General's general duty to defend the
constitutionality of federal law, the Attorney General is required by law to
notify Congress of any decision by the Solicitor General (or the Attorney
General) not to defend an act of Congress.85 These written communications
7 Id. § 288h.
80 See S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1978).
S See H.R. REP. No. 1756, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1978).
"See SALOKAR, supra note 10, at 90.
"See Schwartz, supra note 66, at 1152, 1154.
"See SALOKAR, supra note 10, at 87; Schwartz, supra note 66, at 1153-54.
"The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 provides in part:
The Attorney General shall notify the [Senate Legal] Counsel with respect to
any proceeding in which the United States is a party of any determination by
the Attorney General or Solicitor General not to apeal any court decision
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are revealing, as they have sometimes been used as an opportunity to express
the Justice Department view as to the scope of its obligation to defend
congressional statutes. Michael Davidson, the Senate's Legal Counsel, has
collected a number of such letters. The Davidson Collection reveals that
Attorney General Griffin Bell closed his letters with the following statement:
"The Department of Justice is, of course, fully mindful of its duty to support
the laws enacted by Congress. Here, however, the Department has deter-
mined, after careful study and deliberation, that reasonable arguments cannot
be advanced to defend the challenged statute."'7
Thus far, I have declined in a few instances to defend acts of Congress
on one or the other of these grounds. When such declinations occur, Congress
is so advised and may assume responsibility for the defense itself In one
instance, Congress seemed to accept the decision not to go forward.' In
another, the administration has worked with Congress to amend the statute at
issue to remove what I viewed as a major constitutional defect
But life for the Solicitor General is never simple. Through all of these
twists and turns, it is important for the Solicitor General to keep in mind his
responsibility to be a forceful and effective advocate for the government while
ensuring that he maintains a reputation for "absolute candor and fair dealing"
in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
I know all of this sounds very complicated and anxiety-producing. And
it is on occasion. But I'll let you in on a secret - when all is said and done,
the job is just downright fun.
affecting the constitutionality of an Act or joint resolution of Congress within
such time as will enable the Senate to direct the Counsel to intervene as a party
in such proceeding pursuant to section 288e of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 288k(b) (1988).
" On a more general level, these communications are of interest because Congress
and the Solicitor General rarely communicate with each other in formal settings. In the
past 32 years, Congress has called the Solicitor General to Capitol Hill to testify only
once. See Solicitor General's Office: Hearing Before the Subcomrm. of Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1987); see
also SALOKAR, supra note 10, at 93-94. One commentator expressed the view that these
hearings were held "as a shot across the bow of the Solicitor General's bureaucratic ship"
to warn against politicization of the office. John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics:
The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 799, 812-13 (1992).
Letter from Griffin Bell to Senator Robert Byrd, at 2 (May 8, 1979).
Homell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that
a statute prohibiting use of the words "Crazy Horse" violated First Amendment).
9 See Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
10-416, § 1, tit. I, 108 Stat. 4305, 4306 (1994) (addressing the issues raised in Wauchope
v. United States, 985 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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